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Abstract
In this paper, some new criteria for detecting whether a finite game is potential are proposed by solving potential equations.
The verification equations with the minimal number for checking a potential game are obtained for the first time. Some
connections between the potential equations and the existing characterizations of potential games are established. It is revealed
that a finite game is potential if and only if its every bi-matrix sub-game is potential.
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1 Introduction
Game theory, the science of strategic decision making pi-
oneered by John von Neumann (see von Neumann, J. &
Morgenstern, O., 1953), has wide real-world applications
in many fields, including economics, biology, computer
science and engineering. The Nash equilibrium, named
after John Forbes Nash, Jr, is a fundamental concept in
game theory. The existence and computing of Nash equi-
libria are two central problems in the theory of games.
For two-player zero-sum games, von Neumann proved
the existence of mixed-strategy equilibria using Brouwer
Fixed Point Theorem. Nash proved that if mixed strate-
gies are allowed, then every game with a finite number of
players and strategies has at least one Nash equilibrium
(Nash, 1951). Although pure strategies are conceptually
simpler than mixed strategies, it is usually difficult to
guarantee the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium.
However, it is shown that every finite potential game
possesses a pure-strategyNash equilibrium (Monderer &
Shapley, 1996). The concept of potential game was pro-
posed by Rosenthal(1973). A game is said to be a poten-
tial game if it admits a potential function. The incentive
of all players to change their strategy can be expressed
by the difference in values of the potential function. For
a potential game, the set of pure-strategy Nash equilib-
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ria can be found by searching the maximal values of the
potential function.
An important problem is how to check whether a game
is a potential game. Monderer and Shapley (1996) first
proposed necessary and sufficient conditions for poten-
tial games. But it is required to verify all the simple
closed paths with length 4 for any pair of players. Then
Hino (2011) gave an improved condition for detecting
potential games, which has a lower complexity than that
of Monderer and Shapley (1996) due to that only the
adjacent pairs of strategies of two players need to check.
In Ui (2000), it is proved that a game is potential if
and only if the payoff functions coincide with the Shap-
ley value of a particular class of cooperative games in-
dexed by the set of strategy profiles. Game decomposi-
tion is an important method for potential games (Can-
dogan, Menache, Ozdaglar, & Parrilo, 2011; Hwang, &
Rey-Bellet 2011; Sandholm, 2010) and some new nec-
essary and sufficient conditions for detecting potential
games are obtained. Sandholm (2010) established con-
nections between his results and that in Ui (2000). But
the number of the obtained verification equations is not
the minimum. In Sandholm (2010), it is proved that a
finite game is a potential game if and only if, in each
of the component games, all active players have identi-
cal payoff functions, and that in this case, the potential
function can be constructed.
Recently, Cheng (2014) developed a novel method,
based on the semi-tensor product of matrices, to deal
with games including potential games, networked games
and evolutionary games (Cheng, 2014; Cheng, Xu & Qi,
2014; Cheng, Xu, He, Qi, 2014; Cheng, He, Qi, & Xu,
2015; Guo, Wang, & Li, 2013). In Cheng (2014), a lin-
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ear system, called potential equation, is proposed, and
then it is proved that the game is potential if and only
if the potential equation is solvable. With a solution of
the potential equation, the potential function can be
directly calculated.
A natural question is how to establish the connection be-
tween the potential equation and the other criteria of po-
tential games. Moreover, an interesting problem is how
to get the verification equations with the minimum num-
ber. In this paper, we further investigate the solvabil-
ity of the potential equation. An equivalence transfor-
mation is constructed to convert the augmented matrix
of the potential equation into the reduced row echelon
form. Based on this technique, some new necessary and
sufficient conditions for potential games are obtained.
For potential games, a new formula to calculate the po-
tential functions is proposed. Based on the obtained re-
sults, it is revealed the connection between the potential
equation and the results in Hino (2011) and Sandholm
(2010).
Throughout the paper, we denote the k×k identity ma-
trix by Ik, the i-th column of Ik by δ
i
k, the n-dimensional
column vector whose entries are all equal to 1 by 1k,
Kronecker product by ⊗ and the real number field by R.
2 Preliminaries
Definition 1 (Monderer & Shapley 1996) A finite game
is a triple G = (N , S, C), where
(i) N = {1, 2, · · · , n} is the set of players;
(ii) S = S1×S2×· · ·×Sn is the strategy set, where each
Si = {si1, s
i
2, · · · , s
i
ki
} is the strategy set of player i;
(iii) C = {c1, c2, · · · , cn} is the set of payoff functions,
where every ci : S → R is the payoff function of player i.
Let cµi1i2···in = cµ(s
1
i1
, s2i2 , · · · , s
n
in
) where 1 ≤ is ≤ ks
and s = 1, 2, · · · , n. Then the finite game can be de-
scribed by the arrays
Cµ = {c
µ
i1i2···in
| 1 ≤ is ≤ ks, s = 1, 2, · · · , n} (1)
with µ = 1, 2, · · · , n. Particularly, for a 2-player game,
the k1 × k2 matrices C1 = (c1ij) and C2 = (c
2
ij) are
payoffs of players 1 and 2 respectively. Therefore, a 2-
player finite game is also called a bi-matrix game, which
is usually denoted by the simple notation G = (C1, C2).
Definition 2 (Monderer & Shapley 1996) A finite game
G = (N , S, C) is said to be potential if there exists
a function p : S → R, called the potential function,
such that ci(x, s
−i)− ci(y, s−i) = p(x, s−i)− p(y, , s−i)
for all x, y ∈ Si, s−i ∈ S−i and i = 1, 2, · · · , n, where
S−i = S1 × · · · × Si−1 × Si+1 × · · · × Sn.
Definition 3 (Cheng, Qi, & Li, 2011). Assume A ∈
R
m×n, B ∈ Rp×q. Let α = lcm(n, p) be the least com-
mon multiple of n and p. The left semi-tensor product
of A and B is defined as A⋉B = (A⊗ Iα
n
)(B ⊗ Iα
p
).
Since the left semi-tensor product is a generalization
of the traditional matrix product, the left semi-tensor
product A ⋉ B can be directly written as AB. Iden-
tifying each strategy sij with the logical vector δ
j
ki
for
i = 1, 2, · · · , n and j = 1, 2, · · · , ki, Cheng (2014) gave
a new expression of the payoff functions using the left
semi-tensor product.
Lemma 4 (Cheng, 2014) Let xi ∈ Si be any strategy
expressed in the form of logical vectors. Then, for any
payoff function ci of a finite game G shown in Definition
1, there exists a unique row vector V ci ∈ R
n such that
ci(x1, x2, · · · , xn) = V
c
i x1x2 · · ·xn, (2)
where V ci is called the structure vector of ci and i =
1, 2, · · · , n.
Remark 5 It is easy to see that V ci is just the row vector
composed of the elements ofCi in the lexicographic order
(see (1)). Let C = [(V c1 )
T, (V c2 )
T, · · · , (V cn )
T]T. Then C
is just the payoff matrix of G proposed by Cheng (2014).
Without loss of generality, we assume ki = k for all
i = 1, 2, · · · , n. In Cheng (2014), the potential equation
is proposed as follows:
Ψξ = b, (3)
where
Ψ=


−Ψ1 Ψ2
−Ψ1 Ψ3
...
. . .
−Ψ1 Ψn

, ξ=


ξ1
ξ2
...
ξn

, b =


(V c2 −V
c
1 )
T
(V c3 −V
c
1 )
T
...
(V cn−V
c
1 )
T

 (4)
and Ψi = Iki−1 ⊗ 1k ⊗ Ikn−i for each i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
Lemma 6 (Cheng, 2014) A finite game G shown in Def-
inition 1 is a potential game if and only if the potential
equation (3) has a solution ξ. Moreover, as (3) holds, the
potential function p can be calculated by
(V p)T = (V c1 )
T − (1k ⊗ Ikn−1)ξ1. (5)
3 Bi-matrix games
In this section, we consider the 2-player finite game G =
(C1, C2), where Ci ∈ Rk1×k2 for i = 1, 2. In this special
case, the coefficients of the potential equation (3) become
Ψ = [−1k1⊗Ik2 Ik1⊗1k2], b = (V
c
2 −V
c
1 )
T. (6)
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Before the main results of this section, we first introduce
a basic property on Kronecker product.
Lemma 7 (Horn, 1994) Let Vr(X) denotes the vector-
ization of the matrix X formed by stacking the rows of X
into a single column vector. Then
Vr(ABC) = (A⊗ C
T)Vr(B). (7)
In particular, we have
Vr(AB) = (A⊗ I)Vr(B). (8)
Theorem 8 Set Bk = [Ik−1, −1k−1] ∈ R(k−1)×k. The
bi-matrix game G = (C1, C2) is potential if and only if
Bk1(C2 − C1)B
T
k2
= 0, (9)
where C1, C2 ∈ Rk1×k2 . Moreover, as (9) holds, the
matrix form of each potential function is
P = C1 + [0k1×(k1−1) 1k1 ](C2 − C1) + λ1k11
T
k2
, (10)
where λ ∈ R is an arbitrary number.
Proof. Let Dk = [Ik−1, 0] ∈ R(k−1)×k. Then it is easy
to check that
BkD
T
k = Ik−1, Dkδ
k
k = Bk1k = 0. (11)
Let
E=[−δk1k1⊗Ik2 , B
T
k1
⊗δk2k2 , B
T
k1
⊗BTk2 ]
T∈Rk1k2×k1k2 , (12)
F=[−1k1⊗Ik2 , D
T
k1
⊗1k2 , D
T
k1
⊗DTk2 ]∈R
k1k2×k1k2 . (13)
By (11), a straightforward computation shows that
EF = Ik1k2 . (14)
Eq. (14) shows that E is nonsingular. So the potential
equation is equivalent to
EΨξ = Eb. (15)
With simple calculations, we have
E[Ψ b]=


−(δk1k1 )
T⊗Ik2
Bk1⊗(δ
k2
k2
)T
Bk1⊗Bk2

 [−1k1⊗Ik2 Ik1⊗1k2 b]
=


Ik2 −(δ
k1
k1
)T⊗1k2 −((δ
k1
k1
)T⊗Ik2)b
0 Bk1 (Bk1⊗(δ
k2
k2
)T)b
0 0 (Bk1⊗Bk2)b


=


Ik2 0 −1k2 −((δ
k1
k1
)T⊗Ik2)b
0 Ik1−1 −1k1−1 (Bk1⊗(δ
k2
k2
)T)b
0 0 0 (Bk1⊗Bk2)b

 . (16)
From (16), it follows that (15) is solvable if and only if
(Bk1⊗Bk2)b = 0, (17)
whose matrix form is just (9) by (7). As (9) holds, from
(16), we get
ξ1 = −((δ
k1
k1
)T⊗Ik2)(V
c
2 − V
c
1 )
T − c1k2 , (18)
where c is an arbitrary constant. Substituting (18) into
(5) yields
(V p)T=(V c1 )
T+(1k1(δ
k1
k1
)T⊗Ik2)(V
c
2−V
c
1 )
T+c1k1k2 . (19)
Using (8), from (19), we get
P = C1 + 1k1(δ
k1
k1
)T(C2−C1)+c1k11
T
k2
, (20)
which is just (10). ✷
Corollary 9 Given a bi-matrix game G = (C1, C2), we
write the relative payoffs in the matrix form as
R = (rij) = C2 − C1 =
[
R1 η
ζT rk1k2
]
, (21)
where R1 ∈ R(k1−1)×(k2−1). Then G is potential if and
only if
R1 − 1k1−1ζ
T − η1Tk2−1 + rk1k21k1−11
T
k2−1 = 0, (22)
namely,
rij − rik2 − rk1j + rk1k2 = 0 (23)
for all i = 1, 2, · · · , k1 − 1 and j = 1, 2, · · · , k2 − 1.
Proof. Considering
Bk1RB
T
k2
= [Ik1−1, −1k1−1]
[
R1 η
ζT rk1k2
] [
Ik1−1
−1Tk1−1
]
=R1−1k1−1ζ
T−η1Tk2−1+ rk1k21k1−11
T
k2−1, (24)
we get the corollary from Theorem 8. ✷
The condition (23) of Corollary 9 is similar to the con-
dition proposed in Theorem 3 of Hino (2011). It should
be noted that Theorem 3 of Hino (2011) considers fi-
nite weighted potential games. Here, for the convenience
of comparing our result with that in Hino (2011), we
rewrite Theorem 3 of Hino (2011) for the special case
of 2-player potential games in the language of relative
payoff matrix as follows:
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Proposition 10 (see Theorem 3 of Hino, 2011) The bi-
matrix game G = (C1, C2) is potential if and only if
rij − ri+1,j − ri,j+1 + ri+1,j+1 = 0 (25)
for all i = 1, 2, · · · , k1−1 and j = 1, 2, · · · , k2−1.
The original four-cycle condition proposed by Monderer
& Shapley (1996) is rewritten as:
Proposition 11 (see Corollary 2.9 of Monderer &
Shapley, 1996) The bi-matrix game G = (C1, C2) is
potential if and only if
rij − ri′,j − ri,j′ + ri′,j′ = 0 (26)
for all i, i′ = 1, 2, · · · , k1 and j, j′ = 1, 2, · · · , k2.
Obviously, our condition (23) is different from Hino’s
condition (25) and they have the same complexity, but
(26) has a larger complexity (Hino, 2011).
Remark 12 From (9) or (17), we see that, given the
strategy set for bi-matrix games, the set of all the relative
payoff matrices of potential bi-matrix games is a (k1 +
k2 − 1)-dimensional subspace, which is isomorphic to
P = {b ∈ Rk1k2 | (Bk1⊗Bk2)b = 0}. (27)
Here, we call P the potential subspace. If a bi-matrix
game G = (C1, C2) is not a potential game, then one
can use the orthogonal projection onto P to yield corre-
sponding potential games.
The basic result on orthogonal projection is stated as
follows:
Lemma 13 (see page 430 of Meyer, 2000) Consider a
linear subspace of Rn as follows:
X = {v ∈ Rn| Bv = 0}. (28)
If B has a full row rank, then the orthogonal projection
of u onto X is
ProjXu = (In −B
T(BBT)−1B)u. (29)
Now we consider the orthogonal projection onto the po-
tential subspace.
Lemma 14 Consider a bi-matrix game G = (C1, C2),
where C1, C2 ∈ Rk1×k2 . Denote the relative payoff matrix
by R=(rij)=C2−C1 and let Hk=Ik−
1
k
1k1
T
k . Then
ProjPVr(R) = (Ik1k2 −Hk1 ⊗Hk2)Vr(R). (30)
Proof. Let B˜ = Bk1 ⊗ Bk2 . By Lemma 13, we have
ProjPVr(R)
=(Ik1k2−B˜
T(B˜B˜T)−1B˜)Vr(R)
=(Ik1k2−(B
T
k1
(Bk1B
T
k1
)−1Bk1)⊗(B
T
k2
(Bk2B
T
k2
)−1Bk2))Vr(R). (31)
A straightforward computation shows that
BTk (BkB
T
k )
−1Bk
=
[
Ik−1
−1Tk−1
]
(Ik−1 + 1k−11
T
k−1)
−1[Ik−1 − 1k−1]
=
[
Ik−1
−1Tk−1
]
(Ik−1 −
1
k
1k−11
T
k−1)[Ik−1 − 1k−1]
=
[
Ik−1 −
1
k
1k−11
T
k−1 −
1
k
1k−1
− 1
k
1Tk−1
k−1
k
]
= Ik −
1
k
1k1
T
k = Hk. (32)
From (31) and (32), it follows that (30) holds. ✷
Theorem 15 Consider a bi-matrix game G = (C1, C2),
where C1, C2 ∈ Rk1×k2 . Let the relative payoff matrix be
R= (rij) = C2−C1. Then the following statements are
equivalent:
(i) G is a potential game;
(ii) Hk1RHk2 = 0, where Hk = Ik −
1
k
1k1
T
k ;
(iii) rij = ri−ave + r
j−ave − rave for all i = 1, 2, · · · , k1
and j = 1, 2, · · · , k2, where
ri−ave=
1
k2
k2∑
µ=1
riµ, r
j−ave=
1
k1
k1∑
λ=1
rλj , (33)
rave =
1
k1k2
k1∑
λ=1
k2∑
µ=1
rλµ. (34)
Proof. Obviously, G is a potential game if and only if
ProjPVr(R) = Vr(R), where P is the potential sub-
space. Further by Lemma 14, we have that G is potential
if and only if (Hk1 ⊗Hk2)Vr(R) = 0, i.e. HkRHk = 0.
Moreover, a straightforward calculation shows that
HkRHk
= (Ik1 −
1
k1
1k11
T
k1
)R(Ik2 −
1
k2
1k21
T
k2
)
=R−
1
k1
1k11
T
k1
R−
1
k2
R1k21
T
k2
+
1Tk1R1k2
k1k2
1k11
T
k2
. (35)
From (33)-(35), the equivalence between (ii) and (iii)
follows. ✷
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Remark 16 For the case of k1 = k2, Sandholm (2010)
obtained the results of Theorem 15 using the method
of game decomposition. A similar result can be seen in
Proposition 2.14 of Hwang & Rey-Bellet (2011). But
here, we get the results from the potential equation.
Therefore, we have established a connection between the
potential equation and the results obtained by Sand-
holm (2010). From (33) and (34), we see that ri−ave is
the average relative payoff for given strategy s1i ∈ S1,
rj−ave is the average relative payoff for given strategy
s2j ∈ S2 and r
ave is the average relative payoff of all the
strategies. Therefore, Theorem 15 displays an economic
meaning of potential games.
4 The General Potential Equation
In this section, we consider the general potential equa-
tion for multi-player games and give new detecting con-
ditions for potential games.
Multiplying (3) on the left by
[
0 1
−In−1 1n−1
]
⊗ Ikn , (36)
we get the equivalent equation


−Ψ1 Ψn
−Ψ2 Ψn
. . .
...
−Ψn−1 Ψn




ξ1
ξ2
...
ξn

=


(V cn−V
c
1 )
T
(V cn−V
c
2 )
T
...
(V cn−V
c
n−1)
T

 . (37)
Construct nonsingularmatrix T = [TT1 T
T
2 T
T
3 ]
T, where
Ti =


−Ti1
−Ti2
. . .
−Ti,n−1

 (38)
with
T1j = Ikj−1 ⊗ (δ
k
k)
T ⊗ Ikn−j , (39)
T2j = Ikj−1 ⊗Bk ⊗ Ikn−j−1 ⊗ (δ
k
k)
T, (40)
T3j = Ikj−1 ⊗Bk ⊗ Ikn−j−1 ⊗Bk (41)
for all j = 1, 2, · · · , n. It is easy to check that
T1jΨj=(Ikj−1⊗(δ
k
k)
T⊗Ikn−j)(Ikj−1⊗1k⊗Ikn−j)=Ikn−1 , (42)
T1jΨn=(Ikj−1⊗(δ
k
k)
T⊗Ikn−j)(Ikn−1⊗1k)
=Ikj−1⊗(δ
k
k)
T⊗Ikn−j−1 ⊗ 1k, (43)
T2jΨj=(Ikj−1⊗Bk⊗Ikn−j−1⊗(δ
k
k)
T)(Ikj−1⊗1k⊗Ikn−j)=0,(44)
T2jΨn=(Ikj−1⊗Bk⊗Ikn−j−1 ⊗ (δ
k
k)
T)(Ikn−1⊗1k)
= Ikj−1⊗Bk⊗Ikn−j−1 , (45)
T3jΨj=(Ikj−1⊗Bk⊗Ikn−j−1⊗Bk)(Ikj−1⊗1k⊗Ikn−j)=0, (46)
T3jΨn=(Ikj−1⊗Bk⊗Ikn−j−1 ⊗Bk)(Ikn−1⊗1k) = 0. (47)
So, multiplying (37) on the left by T yields


Ikn−1 −(δ
k
k)
T⊗Ikn−2⊗1k
. . .
...
Ikn−1 −Ikn−2⊗(δ
k
k)
T⊗1k
0 · · · 0 −Bk ⊗ Ikn−2
0 · · · 0 −Ik ⊗Bk ⊗ Ikn−3
...
. . .
...
...
0 · · · 0 −Ikn−2 ⊗Bk
0 · · · 0 0




ξ1
ξ2
...
ξn

=T


(V cn−V
c
1 )
T
(V cn−V
c
2 )
T
...
(V cn −V
c
n−1)
T

 ,
(48)
that is, 

I(n−1)kn−1 Γ
0 Φ
0 0


[
ξ˜
ξn
]
=


T1b˜
T2b˜
T3b˜

 , (49)
where ξ˜ = [ξT1 , · · · , ξ
T
n−1]
T, b˜ = [V cn−V
c
1 , · · · , V
c
n−V
c
n−1]
T,
Φ=[ΦT1 ,Φ
T
2 , · · · ,Φ
T
n−1]
T, Γ = [ΓT1 ,Γ
T
2 , · · · ,Γ
T
n−1]
T with
Φi= −Iki−1⊗Bk⊗Ikn−i−1, Γi=−Iki−1⊗(δ
k
k )
T⊗Ikn−1−i⊗1k (50)
for each i = 1, 2, · · · , n−1.
By (49), we get the proposition as follows:
Proposition 17 The finite game G is potential if and
only if T3b˜ = 0 and the linear equation
Φξn = T2b˜ (51)
has a solution ξn.
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In the following, we consider (51). Let
S=
[
S1
S2
]
=


N11 N12 N13 · · · N1,n−2 N1,n−1
M21 L22 L23 · · · L2,n−2 L2,n−1
M32 L33 · · · L3,n−2 L3,n−1
. . .
. . .
...
...
. . . Ln−2,n−2 Ln−2,n−1
Mn−1,n−2 Ln−1,n−1


,
(52)
where
Nij = Dkn−i(Ikj−i ⊗D
T
k ⊗ 1kn−j−1(δ
kn−j−1
kn−j−1 )
T), (53)
Lij = −Iki−2⊗Bk⊗Nij, (54)
Mi,i−1 = Iki−2(k−1)⊗Bkn−i (55)
for all i = 1, 2, · · · , n− 1 and j = i, i+ 1, · · · , n− 1.
It is easy to check that S is a square matrix with order
(n − 1)(k − 1)kn−2. In order to prove S is nonsingular,
we construct a square matrix as follows:
U=


−Φ1DTkn−1 G1
−Φ2DTkn−1 G2
...
. . .
−Φn−2DTkn−1 Gn−2
−Φn−1DTkn−1 0


, (56)
where Gi = Iki−1(k−1)⊗D
T
kn−i−1
for i = 1, 2, · · · , n− 2.
Lemma 18 For matrices S and U , we have
−
n−1∑
j=1
N1jΦj= Bkn−1 , (57)
Mi,i−1Φi−1 +
n−1∑
j=i
LijΦj = 0 (i=2, 3, · · ·, n−1), (58)
SU = I(n−1)(k−1)kn−2 . (59)
Proof. See Appendix.
From (59), it follows that S is nonsingular. Multiplying
(51) on the left by S, we get an equivalent equation
SΦξn = ST2b˜. (60)
Let SΦ = [ΥT1 ,Υ
T
2 , · · · ,Υ
T
n−1]
T. From (57) and (58), it
follows that Υ1=Bkn−1 = [Ikn−1−1 −1kn−1−1] and Υi = 0
for all i = 2, 3, · · · , n− 1. Thus the linear equation (60)
is just
[Ikn−1−1 − 1kn−1−1]ξn = S1T2b˜, (61)
0 = S2T2b˜. (62)
Then we get the following proposition.
Proposition 19 The linear equation (51) has a solution
ξn if and only if S2T2b˜ = 0.
Theorem 20 Consider the finite game G = (N ,S, C)
described by Definition 1 with payoff functions in (2). G
is potential if and only if
[
S2T2
T3
]
b˜ = 0, (63)
where b˜ = [V cn −V
c
1 , · · · , V
c
n −V
c
n−1]
T and the matrices
T2, T3 and S2 are shown in (38) and (52). Moreover, as
(63) holds, a potential function is described by
p(x1, · · · , xn) = V
px1x2 · · ·xn, (64)
where
(V p)T = (V c1 )
T + (1k(δ
k
k)
T ⊗ Ikn−1 )(V
c
n − V
c
1 )
T
−
n−1∑
j=2
(1k(δ
k
k)
T⊗Ikj−2⊗D
T
k Bk⊗1kn−j(δ
kn−j
kn−j)
T)
·(V cn−V
c
j )
T+c1kn . (65)
Proof. From Proposition 17 and Proposition 19, it fol-
lows that G is potential if and only if (63) holds. Now, we
compute the potential function. From (61), we get the
ξn =
[
S1
0
]
T2b˜+ c1kn−1 , (66)
where c is an arbitrary constant. From (52) and (53), it
follows that
S1 = Dkn−1 S˜1, (67)
where S˜1 = [S˜11, S˜12, · · · , S˜1,n−1] with
S˜1j = Ikj−1 ⊗D
T
k ⊗ 1kn−j−1(δ
kn−j−1
kn−j−1 )
T. (68)
Considering the last row of S˜1 is 0, by (66) and (67), we
have
ξn = S˜1T2b˜+ c1kn−1 . (69)
By the first equation of (48), we obtain that
ξ1=−T11(V
c
n−V
c
1 )
T + ((δkk )
T⊗Ikn−2⊗1k)ξn
=−T11(V
c
n−V
c
1 )
T+((δkk)
T⊗Ikn−2⊗1k)(S˜1T2b˜+c1kn−1).(70)
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Substituting (70) into (5), we have
(V p)T = (V c1 )
T−(1k⊗Ikn−1)ξ1
= (V c1 )
T+(1k⊗Ikn−1)T11(V
c
n−V
c
1 )
T
−((δkk )
T⊗Ikn−2⊗1k)
n−1∑
j=1
S˜1jT2j(V
c
n−V
c
j )
T+c1kn.(71)
Since Dkδ
k
k = 0, we have
((δkk)
T⊗Ikn−2⊗1k)S˜11
= ((δkk)
T⊗Ikn−2⊗1k)(D
T
k ⊗ 1kn−2(δ
kn−2
kn−2 )
T) = 0. (72)
Substituting T11, T2j , S˜1j and (72) into (71) yields (65).
Remark 21 In Section 4 of Sandholm (2010), it is re-
vealed that the minimal number of linear equations to
test potential games is (n − 1)kn − nkn−1 + 1 for a n-
player games with k strategies. However, for both the
methods of Sandholm (2010) and Hino (2011), the num-
ber of equalities to be verified is 12n(n− 1)k
n−2(k − 1)2
(see the footnote of page 455 of Sandholm (2010)), which
is much greater than the minimal number. Fortunately,
using the potential equation in Cheng (2014), we get the
minimal number of equations described by (63).
Theorem 22 For the finite game G = (N ,S, C) de-
scribed by Definition 1 with payoff functions shown in
(2), the following statements are equivalent:
(i) G is potential;
(ii) equalities
(Iki−1 ⊗Bk ⊗ Ikn−i−1⊗Bk)(V
c
n − V
c
i )
T = 0, (73)
(Iki−1⊗Bk⊗Ikj−i−1⊗Bk⊗Ikn−j−1⊗(δ
k
k)
T)(V cj −V
c
i )
T=0 (74)
hold for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n− 1;
(iii) equalities
(Iki−1⊗Bk⊗Ikj−i−1⊗Bk⊗Ikn−j)(V
c
j − V
c
i )
T=0 (75)
hold for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n.
Proof. (i)⇒(ii) Assume that G is potential. Then, from
Proposition 17, it follows that T3b˜ = 0 and the linear
equation (51) is solvable. It is easy to check that T3b˜ = 0
is just (73). Moreover, (51) implies that
(Iks−1⊗Bk⊗Ikn−s−1)ξn=(Iks−1⊗Bk⊗Ikn−s−1⊗(δ
k
k)
T)(V cn−V
c
s)
T.
(76)
Letting s = i in (76) and multiplying (76) on the left by
Ikj−1 ⊗Bk ⊗Ikn−j−1 yield
(Iki−1 ⊗Bk ⊗Ikj−i+1 ⊗Bk ⊗Ikn−j−1)ξn
=(Iki−1⊗Bk⊗Ikj−i+1⊗Bk⊗Ikn−j−1⊗(δ
k
k)
T)(V cn−V
c
i )
T. (77)
Similarly, letting s = j in (76) and multiplying (76) on
the left by Iki−1 ⊗Bk ⊗Ikn−i−1 yield
(Iki−1 ⊗Bk ⊗Ikj−i+1 ⊗Bk ⊗Ikn−j−1)ξn
=(Iki−1⊗Bk⊗Ikj−i+1⊗Bk⊗Ikn−j−1⊗(δ
k
k)
T)(V cn−V
c
j )
T. (78)
Subtracting (78) from (77), we get (74).
(ii)⇒(iii) As j = n, (75) is just (73). For the case of
1 ≤ i < j ≤ n− 1, from (73) and (74), it follows that
(Iki−1⊗Bk⊗Ikj−i−1⊗Bk⊗Ikn−j)(V
c
j − V
c
i )
T
=(Iki−1⊗Bk⊗Ikj−i−1⊗Bk⊗Ikn−j−1⊗(D
T
kBk+1k(δ
k
k )
T))(V cj−V
c
i )
T
=(Iki−1⊗Bk⊗Ikj−i−1⊗Bk⊗Ikn−j−1⊗D
T
kBk)(V
c
n−V
c
i )
T
−(Iki−1⊗Bk⊗Ikj−i−1⊗Bk⊗Ikn−j−1⊗D
T
kBk)(V
c
n−V
c
j )
T
+(Iki−1⊗Bk⊗Ikj−i−1⊗Bk⊗Ikn−j−1+1k(δ
k
k )
T)(V cj−V
c
i )
T
=(Ikj−1⊗Bk⊗Ikn−j−1⊗D
T
k )(Iki−1⊗Bk⊗Ikn−i−1⊗Bk)(V
c
n−V
c
i )
T
−(Iki−1⊗Bk⊗Ikn−i−1⊗D
T
k)(Ikj−1⊗Bk⊗Ikn−j−1⊗Bk)(V
c
n−V
c
j )
T
−(Ikn−2⊗1k)(Iki−1⊗Bk⊗Ikj−i−1⊗Bk⊗Ikn−j−1⊗(δ
k
k)
T)(V cj −V
c
i )
T
= 0. (79)
(iii)⇒(ii) Multiplying (75) on the left by Ikn−1 ⊗ (δ
k
k)
T
yields (74).
(ii)⇒(i) Since T3b˜ = 0 is just (73), by Theorem 15, we
only need to check S2T2 = 0, i.e.
Mi+1,iT2ib˜i −
n−1∑
j=i+1
Li+1,jT2j b˜j = 0 (80)
for all i=1, 2,· · ·, n−2.With simple calculations, we have
Li+1,jT2j
= (Iki−1⊗Bk⊗Dkn−i−1(Ikj−i−1⊗D
T
k⊗1kn−j−1(δ
kn−j−1
kn−j−1 )
T))
·(Ikj−1⊗Bk ⊗ Ikn−j−1⊗(δ
k
k)
T)
= (Iki−1(k−1)⊗Dkn−i−1)(Ikj−2(k−1)⊗D
T
k⊗1kn−j−1(δ
kn−j−1
kn−j−1)
T)
·(Iki−1⊗Bk⊗Ikj−i−1⊗Bk⊗Ikn−j−1⊗(δ
k
k)
T). (81)
From (74) and (81), it follows that
Li+1,jT2j b˜j = Li+1,jT2j b˜i. (82)
Therefore, by (82) and (58), we have
Mi+1,iT2ib˜i−
n−1∑
j=i+1
Li+1,jT2j b˜j
= (Mi+1,iT2i−
n−1∑
j=i+1
Li+1,jT2j)b˜i
= ((Mi+1,iΦi−
n−1∑
j=i+1
Li+1,jΦj)⊗ (δ
k
k )
T)b˜i = 0. (83)
✷
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Using the concept of multi-indexed matrix proposed by
Cheng (2012), we can simplify (75). For details of multi-
indexed matrix, please refer Definition 1.1 and Defini-
tion 1.3 of Cheng (2012). Here, we only give an intuitive
example. Given a 4-dimensional data
X={xi1i2i3i4 | i1=1,2; i2=1,2,3; i3=1,2; i4=1,2,3,4},
we arrange X into a matrix
X1423 =


x1111 x
11
12 x
11
21 x
11
22 x
11
31 x
11
32
x1211 x
12
12 x
12
21 x
12
22 x
12
31 x
12
32
x1311 x
13
12 x
13
21 x
13
22 x
13
31 x
13
32
x1411 x
14
12 x
14
21 x
14
22 x
14
31 x
14
32
x2111 x
21
12 x
21
21 x
21
22 x
21
31 x
21
32
x2211 x
22
12 x
22
21 x
22
22 x
22
31 x
22
32
x2311 x
23
12 x
23
21 x
23
22 x
23
31 x
23
32
x2411 x
24
12 x
24
21 x
24
22 x
24
31 x
24
32


,
where xi1i4i2i3 = xi1i2i3i4 , the multi-index of the rows of
X1423 is i1i4 and the multi-index of the columns is i2i3.
We usually say thatX1423 is in the order of id(i1, i4; 2, 4)×
id(i2, i3; 3, 2).
Lemma 23 Suppose Y = (A1 ⊗ A2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Al)X,
where X and Y be column vectors and Ai ∈ Rmi×ni for
each i = 1, 2, · · · ,m. Assume that the elements of X
and Y are in the order of id(j1,· · ·, jl; n1,· · ·, nl) and
id(i1,· · ·, il; m1,· · ·,ml) respectively. Then
Y s1···str1···rl−t=(As1⊗· · ·⊗Asl)X
s1···st
r1···rl−t
(Ar1⊗· · ·⊗Arl−t)
T,
where {s1, · · · , st, r1, · · · , rl−t} = {1, 2, · · · , l}.
By Lemma 23 and (75) of Theorem 22, we get the fol-
lowing corollary.
Corollary 24 Consider finite game G = (N ,S, C) de-
scribed by Definition 1 with payoff functions shown in
(2). Let Rj→i be the multi-dimensional data of the rela-
tive payoffs with respect to j > i, i.e. Rj→i = V cj − V
c
i .
Then G is potential if and only if
(Bk ⊗Bk)(R
j→i)ij
12···ˆi···jˆ···n
= 0 (84)
for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, where a caret is used to denote
missing terms.
Remark 25 Similar to Theorem 15, (84) is equivalent
to
(Hk ⊗Hk)(R
j→i)ij
12···ˆi···jˆ···n
= 0, (85)
which is consistent with the result of Sandholm (2010).
But our result is derived from the potential equation.
Thus we have established a connection between the re-
sult of Cheng (2014) and that of Sandholm (2010).
For players i and j, arbitrarily given the strategies of
the other players, the payoffs of i and j admit a bi-
matrix game, which is called a bi-matrix sub-game of
G. Obviously, the relative payoffs of each bi-matrix sub-
game are just lie in one column of some (Rj→i)ij
12···ˆi···jˆ···n
.
Therefore, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 26 A finite game G is potential if and only if
every bi-matrix sub-game of G is potential.
5 An example
Example 27 Consider a finite game G with n = 3, k =
2 and payoff matrix C = (cµi1i2i3). Let
R =
[
r1111 r
1
112 r
1
121 r
1
122 r
1
211 r
1
212 r
1
221 r
1
222
r2111 r
2
112 r
2
121 r
2
122 r
2
211 r
2
212 r
2
221 r
2
222
]
,
where each rµijk = c
3
ijk−c
µ
ijk for µ = 1, 2. A computation
shows that the coefficient matrix of (63) is


0 1 0 −1 0 −1 0 1 0 −1 0 1 0 1 0 −1
1 −1 0 0 −1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 −1 0 0 −1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 −1 −1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 −1 −1 1


.
Thus, by Theorem 20, the game is a potential game if
and only if


r1112−r
1
122−r
1
212+r
1
222−r
2
112+r
2
122+r
2
212−r
2
222=0,
r1111 − r
1
112 − r
1
211 + r
1
212 = 0,
r1121 − r
1
122 − r
1
221 + r
1
222 = 0,
r2111 − r
2
112 − r
2
211 + r
2
212 = 0,
r2121 − r
2
122 − r
2
221 + r
2
222 = 0,
which has the minimal number of equations for detecting
whether G is potential.
6 Conclusions
For detecting whether a finite game is potential, new
necessary and sufficient conditions have been obtained
by investigating the potential equations. The number of
the obtained verification equalities is minimal. The con-
nections between the potential equations and the exist-
ing results on potential games have been revealed. It has
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been shown that a finite game is potential if and only if
its every bi-matrix sub-game is potential. In the future
work, we will use the potential equation to investigate
near-potential games, networked game and so on.
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Appendix: Proof of Lemma 18
By the basic fact DTkBk = Ik − 1k(δ
k
k)
T, we have
−
n−1∑
j=1
N1jΦj
=
n−1∑
j=1
Dkn−1(Ikj−1⊗D
T
kBk ⊗ 1kn−j−1(δ
kn−j−1
kn−j−1 )
T)
=Dkn−1
n−1∑
j=1
Ikj−1⊗(Ik − 1k(δ
k
k)
T)⊗ 1kn−j−1(δ
kn−j−1
kn−j−1 )
T
=Dkn−1(
n−1∑
j=1
Ikj⊗1kn−j−1(δ
kn−j−1
kn−j−1 )
T−
n−1∑
j=1
Ikj−1⊗1kn−j(δ
kn−j
kn−j )
T)
=Dkn−1(Ikn−1 − 1kn−1(δ
kn−1
kn−1 )
T)
=Dkn−1D
T
kn−1Bkn−1
=Bkn−1 = [Ikn−1−1 − 1kn−1−1]. (86)
For every i = 2, 3, · · · , n− 1, similarly, we have
−Mi,i−1Φi−1 −
n−1∑
j=i
LijΦj
=Iki−2⊗Bk ⊗Bkn−i −
n−1∑
j=i
Iki−2 ⊗Bk ⊗ (Dkn−i
·(Ikj−i⊗D
T
kBk ⊗ 1kn−j−1(δ
kn−j−1
kn−j−1 )
T))
=Iki−2⊗Bk ⊗Bkn−i −
n−1∑
j=i
Iki−2 ⊗Bk ⊗ (Dkn−i
·(Ikj−i⊗(Ik − 1k(δ
k
k )
T)⊗ 1kn−j−1(δ
kn−j−1
kn−j−1 )
T))
=Iki−2⊗Bk⊗Bkn−i−Iki−2⊗Bk⊗Dkn−i(Ikn−i−1kn−1(δ
kn−i
kn−i )
T)
=Iki−2⊗Bk⊗Bkn−i−Iki−2⊗Bk⊗Dkn−iD
T
kn−iBkn−i
=0. (87)
Moreover, by the fact that BkD
T
k = Ik−1 we have
Mi,i−1Gi−1 = (Iki−2(k−1)⊗Bkn−i)(Iki−2(k−1)⊗D
T
kn−i)
= Iki−2(k−1)(kn−i−1). (88)
From Dkδ
k
k = 0, it follows that
LijGj =−(Iki−2⊗Bk⊗Nij)(Ikj−1(k−1)⊗D
T
kn−j−1)
=−Iki−2⊗Bk⊗Nij(Ikj−i(k−1)⊗D
T
kn−j−1)
=−Iki−2⊗Bk⊗Dkn−i(Ikj−i⊗D
T
k
⊗1kn−j−1(δ
kn−j−1
kn−j−1 )
T)(Ikj−i+1⊗D
T
kn−j−1)
=−Iki−2⊗Bk⊗Dkn−i(Ikj−i⊗D
T
k
⊗1kn−j−1(Dkn−j−1δ
kn−j−1
kn−j−1 )
T)
= 0. (89)
From (86)-(89), we get (59).
9
